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Proximity Detection with Single-Antenna IoT
Devices
Timothy J. Pierson, Travis Peters, Ronald Peterson, David Kotz
Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA 03755
ABSTRACT
Providing secure communications between wireless de-
vices that encounter each other on an ad-hoc basis is a
challenge that has not yet been fully addressed. In these
cases, close physical proximity among devices that have
never shared a secret key is sometimes used as a basis of
trust; devices in close proximity are deemed trustworthy
while more distant devices are viewed as potential ad-
versaries. Because radio waves are invisible, however, a
user may believe a wireless device is communicating with
a nearby device when in fact the user’s device is com-
municating with a distant adversary. Researchers have
previously proposed methods for multi-antenna devices
to ascertain physical proximity with other devices, but
devices with a single antenna, such as those commonly
used in the Internet of Things, cannot take advantage
of these techniques.
We present theoretical and practical evaluation of
a method called SNAP – SiNgle Antenna Proximity –
that allows a single-antenna Wi-Fi device to quickly
determine proximity with another Wi-Fi device. Our
proximity detection technique leverages the repeating
nature Wi-Fi’s preamble and the behavior of a signal
in a transmitting antenna’s near-field region to detect
proximity with high probability; SNAP never falsely
declares proximity at ranges longer than 14 cm.
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1 INTRODUCTION
People and the devices they wear or carry may soon
encounter dozens, possibly hundreds, of new devices each
day if predictions about the Internet of Things (IoT)
come true. These IoT devices are envisioned to share
data and actuator control information among themselves,
and some of that information may be privacy sensitive
or have security implications. This situation suggests
that devices that have never met, nor shared a secret,
must somehow have a way to securely communicate that
is consistent with user intent.
Providing secure, user-intended communications be-
tween devices that encounter each other on an ad-hoc
basis is a challenge that has not yet been fully ad-
dressed [13]. The main difficulty is that the newly dis-
covered devices do not have a common point of trust. In
these situations, researchers have previously proposed
using physical proximity as one basis of trust [8, 19, 21,
24, 25, 28, 30]. The idea is that a user can express in-
tent to introduce two devices by bringing them within a
few centimeters of each other, at least temporarily, and
then taking an action such as pressing a button. Adver-
saries, however, are assumed to be unable to come into
such close proximity (e.g., an adversary does not break
into a home to gain close physical access to devices).
The physical proximity between legitimate devices then
forms a basis of trust (whether the devices have been
compromised is out of scope) and nearby devices can
then bootstrap a secure connection among themselves.
A distant adversary, however, may attempt to trick a
user’s devices into accepting a malicious payload by
impersonating a nearby legitimate device.
Several techniques have been proposed to combat such
impersonation attacks. Often these techniques rely on
short-range out-of-band communication where devices
use a secret channel for communication that is imper-
vious to observation or interference by an adversary.
These methods frequently require additional hardware
such as accelerometers [38], light sensors [23], or special-
ized radio frequency (RF) devices such as NFC [1]. The
required out-of-band hardware may not be present on
some devices and these approaches often require com-
plex processing that exceeds the capabilities of many
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embedded devices. Other approaches to thwarting dis-
tant adversaries use in-band RF, but rely on multiple
antennas to simultaneously measure signal strength to
determine proximity [8, 28] or to locate a device in three
dimensions [22, 35]. Single-antenna IoT devices with
limited hardware that follow standard communication
protocols, however, cannot use these techniques.
In this paper we present a novel method called SNAP –
SiNgle Antenna Proximity – that enables a single-antenna
device following the standard Wi-Fi protocol to quickly
determine when it is in close proximity to a transmitting
antenna. Our technique leverages the repeating nature
Wi-Fi’s preamble and the characteristics of a transmit-
ting antenna’s near field region (i.e., the region physically
close to the antenna) to detect proximity with a trans-
mitter. When a receiving device is physically close to
a transmitter, near-field effects will cause repeated por-
tions of the preamble to differ in phase and amplitude,
whereas when the device is far from the transmitter, the
repeated portions of the preamble will be received with a
consistent phase and amplitude. We use the presence or
absence of phase and amplitude mismatches to determine
whether the single-antenna device is near a transmitter.
Contributions
We present the following contributions in this paper:
∙ a novel method for a single-antenna device to
quickly and accurately determine when it is in
close proximity with a transmitting device;
∙ a reference Wi-Fi implementation that performs
the same frame decoding steps any Wi-Fi device
must perform; and
∙ an experimental evaluation of the technique using
several popular types of antennas.
2 WI-FI PREAMBLE
In this section we briefly describe the Wi-Fi preamble,
focusing on the repeating portions of the Long Train-
ing Field (LTF). We show that when a receiver is far
from a transmitter, even though the channel changes
the transmitted signal, the repeated portions of the LTF
are changed consistently and are received with matching
phase and amplitude. In Section 3 we show that when the
receiver is in the transmitter’s near field, this consistency
does not hold, allowing SNAP to determine proximity
with the transmitter.
2.1 PHY layer preamble format
Every Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
Wi-Fi frame begins with a physical (PHY) layer preamble
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A short OFDM training symbol consists of 12 subcarriers, which are modulated by the elements of the
sequence S, given by
S–26, 26 = (13/6) u{0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, 0,
 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0,0} (17-6)
The multiplication by a factor of (13/6) is in order to normalize the average power of the resulting OFDM
symbol, which utilizes 12 out of 52 subcarriers.
The signal shall be generated according to the following equation: 
(17-7)
The fact that only spectral lines of S–26:26 with indices that are a multiple of 4 have nonzero amplitude
results in a periodicity of TFFT/4 = 0.8 Ps. The interval TSHORT is equal to ten 0.8 Ps periods (i.e., 8 Ps).
Generation of the short training sequence is illustrated in Table I-2.
A long OFDM training symbol consists of 53 subcarriers (including the value 0 at dc), which are modulated
by the elements of the sequence L, given by
L–26, 26 = {1, 1, –1, –1, 1, 1, –1, 1, –1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, –1, –1, 1, 1, –1, 1, –1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 
 1, –1, –1, 1, 1, –1, 1, –1, 1, –1, –1, –1, –1, –1, 1, 1, –1, –1, 1, –1, 1, –1, 1, 1, 1, 1} (17-8)
A long OFDM training symbol shall be generated according to the following equation:
(17-9)
where 
TG 12 = 1.6 Ps
Two periods of the long sequence are transmitted for improved channel estimation accuracy, yielding
TLONG = 1.6 + 2 u3.2 = 8 Ps.
Figure 17-4—OFDM training structure
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8 + 8 = 16 Ps
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Signal Detect,
AGC, Diversity
 
Coarse Freq.
Offset Estimation
 
Channel and Fine Frequency RATE SERVICE + DATA DATA
t10
Selection timing synchronize
Offset Estimation LENGTH
rSHORT t  wTSHORT t  Sk j2Sk'Ft exp
k NST 2e–=
NST 2e
¦=
rLONG t  wTLONG t  Lk (j2Sk'F t TG12– )exp
k NST 2e–=
NST 2e
¦=
Short Training Field Long Training Field Signal Field Frame  data
Figure 1: Wi-Fi OFDM PHY preamble format.
Ea h Wi-Fi frame begins with a PHY layer pre-
amble consisting of a Short Training Field (STF)
and a Long Training Field (LTF). The STF and
LTF are followed by a Signal field and then the
frame’s data [17].
to aid in synchronizing the transmitter and receiver.1 The
format of the PHY layer preamble is shown in Figure 1
and consists of a Short Training Field (STF) followed
by a Long Training Field. These fields are followed by a
Sig l Field and then the Wi-Fi frame’s data.
The STF co sists of 10 i entical short training sym-
bols (denoted 𝑡1 through 𝑡10 in Figure 1) where each STF
symbol is sampled 16 times, for a total of 160 samples.
The STF is used by the receiver for frame detection, au-
tomatic gain control, coarse frequency offset estimation,
and rough sy bol timing synchronization. We discuss
the STF in more detail in Section 4 below.
The Long Training Field follows the Short Training
Field and is used by the receiver for fine frequency correc-
tion and channel estimation. Important to our proximity
detection technique, the LTF contains two identical 64-
sample symbols. We discuss the LTF in Section 2.2.
A Signal field encoded with Binary Phase Shift Keying
(BPSK) follows the LTF. It provides information about
the rest of the Wi-Fi frame including the number of
bytes and the encoding scheme used on the frame’s data.
Data carried by the Wi-Fi frame comes after the Signal
field. Each OFDM data symbol consists of a 16-sample
guard interval (denoted GI in Figure 1) and 64 samples
carrying the actual data.
2.2 Long Training Field
The LTF consists of a 32-sample guard interval (denoted
GI2 because it is twice as long as other guard intervals in
the frame) followed by two identical 64-sample OFDM
symbols that are denoted 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 in Figure 1. The
guard interval together with 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 make a total of
160 samples in the LTF. Because 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 are identi-
cal, the phase and amplitude of sample 𝑖 in symbol 𝑇1
matches the phase and amplitude of sample 𝑖+64 in 𝑇2,
1Here we focus on 20 MHz wide channels but the technique could
easily be extended for wider channels.
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Figure 2: Time domain amplitude of the Long
Training Field. In the time domain, sample 𝑖 in
𝑇1 matches sample 𝑖+ 64 in 𝑇2 in phase and am-
plitude. Here we highlight how sample 16 in 𝑇1
matches sample 80 (16 + 64) in 𝑇2.
where 𝑖 = 0 . . . 63. This relationship between samples is
shown in Figure 2.
The time-domain samples can be converted into an
equivalent frequency-domain representing by taking a
Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), which is nearly al-
ways implemented in real hardware with a Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT). Wi-Fi receivers perform a 64-point
FFT over the received time-domain samples to transform
the time-domain samples into the frequency domain. The
FFT operation yields 64 complex numbers representing
the phase and amplitude of 64 subcarriers, indexed from
-32 to +31 [17]. Figure 3 shows 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 represented
in the frequency domain. Provided samples in the time
domain in 𝑇1 match corresponding samples in 𝑇2 at the
receiver, the phases and amplitudes of each subcarrier
after an FFT of the samples in 𝑇1 will also match the
phases and amplitudes of each subcarrier after an FFT
of the samples in 𝑇2. If the samples in the time domain
do not match, however, the phases and amplitudes of
the subcarriers will also not match.
2.3 Channel State Information
The channel between the transmitter and receiver will
modify the transmitted signal because the signal takes
multiple paths while in flight, reflecting off or passing
through objects in the environment. These multi-path
signals add up constructively or destructively at the
receiver and the result is that the samples will not be
received with the same phase and amplitude with which
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I.1.3.2 Generation of the long sequences
The frequency domain representation of the long training sequence part of the preamble is given in
Table I-5.
The time domain representation is derived by performing IFFT on the contents of Table I-5, cyclically
extending the result to get the cyclic prefix, and then multiplying with the window function given in I.1.3.1.
The resulting 161 points vector is shown in Table I-6. The samples are appended to the short sequence
section by overlapping and adding element 160 of Table I-4 to element 0 of Table I-6. 
Table I-5—Frequency domain representation of the long sequences
## Re Im ## Re Im ## Re Im ## Re Im
–32 0.000 0.000 –16 1.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 16 1.000 0.000
–31 0.000 0.000 –15 1.000 0.000 1 1.000 0.000 17 –1.000 0.000
–30 0.000 0.000 –14 1.000 0.000 2 –1.000 0.000 18 –1.000 0.000
–29 0.000 0.000 –13 1.000 0.000 3 –1.000 0.000 19 1.000 0.000
–28 0.000 0.000 –12 1.000 0.000 4 1.000 0.000 20 –1.000 0.000
–27 0.000 0.000 –11 –1.000 0.000 5 1.000 0.000 21 1.000 0.000
–26 1.000 0.000 –10 –1.000 0.000 6 –1.000 0.000 22 –1.000 0.000
–25 1.000 0.000 –9 1.000 0.000 7 1.000 0.000 23 1.000 0.000
–24 –1.000 0.000 –8 1.000 0.000 8 –1.000 0.000 24 1.000 0.000
–23 –1.000 0.000 –7 –1.000 0.000 9 1.000 0.000 25 1.000 0.000
–22 1.000 0.000 –6 1.000 0.000 10 –1.000 0.000 26 1.000 0.000
–21 1.000 0.000 –5 –1.000 0.000 11 –1.000 0.000 27 0.000 0.000
–20 –1.000 0.000 –4 1.000 0.000 12 –1.000 0.000 28 0.000 0.000
–19 1.000 0.000 –3 1.000 0.000 13 –1.000 0.000 29 0.000 0.000
–18 –1.000 0.000 –2 1.000 0.000 14 –1.000 0.000 30 0.000 0.000
–17 1.000 0.000 –1 1.000 0.000 15 1.000 0.000 31 0.000 0.000
Table I-6—Time domain representation of the long sequence
## Re Im ## Re Im ## Re Im ## Re Im
0 –0.078 0.000 1 0.012 –0.098 2 0.092 –0.106 3 –0.092 –0.115
4 –0.003 –0.054 5 0.075 0.074 6 –0.127 0.021 7 –0.122 0.017
8 –0.035 0.151 9 –0.056 0.022 10 –0.060 –0.081 11 0.070 –0.014
12 0.082 –0.092 13 –0.131 –0.065 14 –0.057 –0.039 15 0.037 –0.098
16 0.062 0.062 17 0.119 0.004 18 –0.022 –0.161 19 0.059 0.015
Figure 3: Fr quency o ain represe tatio of 𝑇1
and 𝑇2 in the LTF. 𝑅𝑒 is the r al component and
𝐼𝑚 is the imaginary component of the complex
number representing the phase and amplitude of
each subcarrier [17].
they were transmitted. This signal change suggests the
possibility that samples in 𝑇1 may not have the same
phase and amplitude as the corresponding sample in
𝑇2 when the signal is received. We see next, however,
that those samples will match (except for random noise)
when the receiver is not in the transmitter’s near-field
region.
The channel between the transmitter and receiver can
be mathematically expressed as [33]
y[𝑖] = Hx[𝑖] +w[𝑖] (1)
where y[𝑖] is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ received sample, H is the channel
matrix representing the changes to the signal caused by
the channel, x[𝑖] is 𝑖𝑡ℎ the transmitted sample, and w[𝑖]
is noise received with sample 𝑖. In a static environment
(e.g., no moving objects), H is time invariant and causes
the same shift in phase and amplitude for all samples
in x because all transmitted samples take the same
multipaths from sender to receiver. Neglecting noise, the
result is that sample y[𝑖] still matches sample y[𝑖+64] in
phase and amplitude, even though they no longer match
x[𝑖] due to the effects of H.
This phase and amplitude change in the received sam-
ple compared with the transmitted sample is normal
for wireless communication and is one of the reasons
why Wi-Fi uses a preamble. The phase and amplitude
of the preamble samples are pre-defined by the Wi-Fi
specification and are known to both the transmitter and
receiver. The transmitter sends the preamble at the pre-
defined phase and amplitude and the receiver uses these
known phase and amplitude values in the STF to de-
tect the start of the frame and apply a coarse frequency
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correction. Next it uses the LTF to synchronize symbol
timing and apply fine frequency correction. Finally, be-
cause each subcarrier may be impacted differently by
the channel, the receiver performs an FFT of the re-
ceived time-domain signal to independently measure the
phase and amplitude of each frequency-domain subcar-
rier in the LTF. The receiver computes the difference
from the known transmitted phases and amplitudes for
each subcarrier (see Figure 3) and the received phases
and amplitudes to estimate the channel’s impact on each
subcarrier. This estimate is called Channel State Infor-
mation or CSI. The receiver uses this estimate from the
LTF to correct for the channel’s effects.
2.4 Coherence time
Above we consider an environment with no moving ob-
jects and we see in Equation (1) that H is time invariant
so corresponding samples in 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 will be received
with identical phase and amplitude (except for noise).
In the real world, however, the transmitter, receiver, or
other objects may be moving and that movement may
impact the signal. A channel is said to be coherent if it is
stable over a particular time interval. We can calculate
the needed coherence time, 𝑇𝑐, for the corresponding
portions of the preamble. If the channel is coherent over
𝑇𝑐 then the corresponding samples will be received with
the same phase and amplitude.
Wi-Fi samples at 20 MHz, meaning it takes 20 million
samples per second. The time for one sample, 𝑇𝑠, is then
1/(20,000,000 samples/second) which equates to 50 ns.
𝑇1 and 𝑇2 are a total of 128 samples long, and because
we are interested in how 𝑇1 matches 𝑇2, we require a
coherence time of 6.4 𝜇s (50 ns/sample × 128 samples =
6.4 𝜇s). In this case, if the channel is stable over 6.4 𝜇s,
then 𝑇1 will match 𝑇2 (aside from noise).
2.5 Moving objects
Moving objects can potentially cause a mismatch by
changing the length of the signal’s path as it travels
from transmitter to receiver. The length of the path
affects the phase and amplitude of the signal according
to the following formula [33]
H =
𝑃∑︁
𝑝=1
𝑎𝑝𝑒
−𝑗2𝜋𝑑𝑝/𝜆 (2)
where 𝑎𝑝 is the attenuation of the signal along the path 𝑝,
𝑑𝑝 is the length of path 𝑝, and 𝜆 is the wavelength. The
length of path 𝑝 may change as the transmitter, receiver,
or multipath-inducing objects move. To cause a signifi-
cant change in the signal between corresponding samples,
however, the movement would need to cause a change in
path length of more than one-quarter wavelength (and
one-half wavelength to cause maximum change) [33]. In
Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band, the wavelength 𝜆 is approximately
12 cm, suggesting that an object would need to move
approximately 𝜆/4 ≈ 3 cm in 6.4 𝜇s to significantly
impact the phase and amplitude between correspond-
ing LTF samples. This translates to a speed of over
17,000 km/hour (and roughly twice this speed for Wi-
Fi’s 5 GHz band). Given the extraordinary speed an
object would need to be moving to cause a substantial
change in path length in the short coherence time needed
for the preamble, we eliminate changing path lengths as
a possible explanation for corresponding LTF samples
to have different phases and amplitudes.
2.6 Implication
The implication of this section is that the channel be-
tween the receiver and a transmitter will not cause a
significant difference in the phase and amplitude between
repeating portions of the LTF, even in the presence of
moving objects, but this section implicitly assumes that
the transmitter is far from the receiver. We find in the
next section that near-field effects can cause differences
in the corresponding LTF samples when the transmitter
is near the receiver. We use those differences to detect
when the receiver is near the transmitter. If those differ-
ences are not present, we infer that the receiver is far
from the transmitter.
3 NEAR FIELD
The area around a transmitting antenna is generally
classified into three different regions: (1) the reactive
near-field is closest to the transmitting antenna, (2) the
radiating near-field begins after the reactive near-field,
and (3) the far-field begins after the radiating near-
field and extends to infinity. These regions are shown
in Figure 4. The boundaries between regions are not
sharp, but instead transition gradually.
Using the orientation depicted in Figure 5, where the
antenna is aligned vertically with the 𝑧 axis, a signal’s
magnetic fields H relative to each axis2 are determined
by the following formulas [4]
𝐻𝑟 = 𝐻𝜃 = 0 (3a)
𝐻𝜑 = 𝑗
𝑘𝐼0𝑙𝑡 sin 𝜃
4𝜋𝑟
[︂
1 +
1
𝑗𝑘𝑟
]︂
𝑒−𝑗𝑘𝑟 (3b)
2Here H refers to the magnetic field, whereas previously the same
symbol referred to CSI. Unfortunately, this overloading is common
in the literature.
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Figure 4: Regions surrounding a transmitting an-
tenna. A transmitting antenna with length 𝑙𝑡 has
three surrounding regions: (1) th reactive near-
field, (2) the radiating near-field, and (3) the far-
field. 𝐷 is the length of the transmitting antenna
𝑙𝑡 plus the length of the receiving antenna, 𝑙𝑟 [4].
and the electric fields E are determined by
𝐸𝑟 = 𝜂
𝐼0𝑙𝑡 cos 𝜃
2𝜋𝑟2
[︂
1 +
1
𝑗𝑘𝑟
]︂
𝑒−𝑗𝑘𝑟 (4a)
𝐸𝜃 = 𝑗𝜂
𝑘𝐼0𝑙𝑡 sin 𝜃
4𝜋𝑟
[︂
1 +
1
𝑗𝑘𝑟
− 1
(𝑘𝑟)2
]︂
𝑒−𝑗𝑘𝑟 (4b)
𝐸𝜑 = 0 (4c)
where 𝑗 =
√−1, 𝑘 = 2𝜋/𝜆 is the wavenumber, 𝐼0 is
current applied to the transmitter, 𝑙𝑡 is the length of
the transmitting antenna, 𝜂 = 120𝜋 is the intrinsic
impedance of free space, 𝜃 is the vertical angle between
the transmitter and receiver, 𝜑 is the horizontal angle be-
tween the transmitter and receiver, and 𝑟 is the distance
extending radially from the transmitter.
3.1 Reactive near-field region
The reactive near-field region is the region closest to
the transmitting antenna, where 𝑘𝑟 < 1 (or equivalently,
where 𝑟 < 𝜆/2𝜋). In this region the reactive (e.g, non-
radiating) field dominates and there is a high content
of non-propagating stored energy. Here the wavefront is
not spherical because the electric and magnetic fields
are not yet aligned, and in addition to the radiated
z"
 "
x"
 "
y"
 "
θ
 "
ɸ
 "
Er"
Eθ "
Eɸ "
Figure 5: Antenna orientation. To provide a com-
mon reference, the transmitting antenna is typi-
cally assumed to be aligned with the vertical (z)
axis as shown. Redrawn from Balanis [4].
energy described by the first term in brackets in Equa-
tions (3b), (4a), and (4b), there is a great deal of stored,
non-propagating energy because the second and third
terms inside the brackets dominate at close range.
With real antennas, the reactive near-field region is
commonly estimated to extend from the surface of the
antenna to roughly 𝑅1, defined as [4]
𝑅1 = 0.62
√︀
𝐷3/𝜆 (5)
where 𝐷 = 𝑙𝑡 + 𝑙𝑟 is the combined length of the trans-
mitting antenna, 𝑙𝑡, and the receiving antenna, 𝑙𝑟, and 𝜆
is the signal wavelength. With Wi-Fi 2.4 GHz band, and
quarter-wavelength dipole antennas, this region extends
to roughly 2.7 cm from the transmitter. In Wi-Fi’s 5 GHz
band this region extends to roughly 1.1 cm.
3.2 Radiating near-field (Fresnel)
region
Sometimes referred to as the Fresnel or intermediate
field, the radiating near-field region is the area between
the reactive near-field and far-field regions. In this re-
gion 𝑘𝑟 > 1 and the electric and magnetic fields are
predominantly in phase, but the wavefront is still not
yet spherical as it is in the far-field region. Examining
Equations (3b) and (4a) we see that, unlike in the reac-
tive near field, the first term in the brackets (1) begins
to dominate the second term ( 1𝑗𝑘𝑟 ) because 𝑘𝑟 is greater
than one. Likewise, in Equation (4b), the first term in
the brackets (1) begins to dominate the second ( 1𝑗𝑘𝑟 )
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and third terms ( 1(𝑘𝑟)2 ). Because of the increasing value
of 𝑘𝑟 compared with the reactive near-field region, the
energy in the radiating near field is largely real, that is,
radiated energy.
We can estimate the average power of the signal, 𝑊 ,
using the following equation [4]:
W =
1
2
(E×H*) (6)
where * denotes complex conjugate and E and H are de-
termined using Equations (3) and (4). 𝑊 can be decom-
posed into its radial, 𝑊𝑟, and vertical, 𝑊𝜃 components
as follows [4]:
𝑊𝑟 =
𝜂
8
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝐼0𝑙𝑡
𝜆
⃒⃒⃒⃒2
sin2 𝜃
𝑟2
[︂
1− 𝑗 1
(𝑘𝑟)3
]︂
(7a)
𝑊𝜃 = 𝑗𝜂
𝑘|𝐼0𝑙𝑡|2 cos 𝜃 sin 𝜃
16𝜋2𝑟3
[︂
1 +
1
(𝑘𝑟)2
]︂
. (7b)
Mapping the power of each of these components, we
see in Figure 6 for Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band with quarter-
wavelength antennas, at distances larger than roughly
5 cm the 𝑊𝜃 component begins to dominate the 𝑊𝑟
component as it does in the far field. At distances closer
than about 5 cm the radial component is stronger than
the vertical component. This relative strength suggests
the power pulses inward and outward near the transmit-
ter, whereas at greater distances, the radial component
dies out and vertical component takes over. This vertical
component domination is indicative of signals in the
far-field region, whereas radial component domination is
indicative of signals in the radiating near-field region.
With real antennas, the radiating near-field region is
commonly estimated to extend from 𝑅1 to 𝑅2, where
𝑅2 is defined [4]
𝑅2 = 2𝐷
2/𝜆. (8)
With Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band and quarter-wavelength
dipole antennas, Equation (8) suggests this region ex-
tends to approximately 6.2 cm from the transmitter. This
estimate roughly matches the results shown in Figure 6
using Equations (7) where the vertical component of
the energy begins to dominate as it does it the far field.
We note, however, that this boundary is not a sharp
distinction between the radiating near-field and the far-
field. We see in Figure 6 that the radial and vertical
components are nearly equivalent for some distance past
this point, but that by 12 cm distance 𝑊𝜃 is roughly
three times stronger than 𝑊𝑟.
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Figure 6: Power of the radial and vertical com-
ponents of a signal. Using Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band
and Equation (7), the vertical component 𝑊𝜃 be-
gins to dominate the radial component 𝑊𝑟 at
about 5 cm.
3.3 Far-field (Fraunhofer) region
The far field, sometimes referred to as the Fraunhofer
region, is the area far from the transmitting antenna
where 𝑘𝑟 ≫ 1. Because 𝑘𝑟 is large in the far field, several
of the terms in Equations (3) and (4) become extremely
small and the E and H fields can be approximated by
the much simpler formulas [4]
𝐸𝜃 ≃ 𝑗𝜂 𝑘𝐼0𝑙𝑡𝑒
−𝑗𝑘𝑟
4𝜋𝑟
sin 𝜃 (9a)
𝐸𝑟 ≃ 𝐸𝜑 = 𝐻𝑟 = 𝐻𝜃 = 0 (9b)
𝐻𝜑 ≃ 𝑗 𝑘𝐼0𝑙𝑡𝑒
−𝑗𝑘𝑟
4𝜋𝑟
sin 𝜃. (9c)
In Equation (9) we see that the electric and magnetic
fields are aligned orthogonal to each other (e.g., 𝜃 is
orthogonal to 𝜑), transverse to the direction of propa-
gation, and are in time synchronization. This alignment
creates a spherical wavefront with average power given
by Equation (6).
3.4 Near-field impact on LTF samples
At ranges closer than roughly 𝑅2, the overall E and H
fields are not in phase with respect to time, and because
those fields do not have equal magnitude, they form a
vector that rotates in time in a plane parallel to the
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direction of propagation, rather than the stable orthogo-
nal relationship in the far-field region [4]. Wi-Fi samples
taken as the E and H fields rotate can result in different
phase and amplitude readings between corresponding
samples in the LTF. We see in Section 5, as suggested
by Figure 6, there is a difference in phase and amplitude
in the corresponding LTF samples out to about 12 cm.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We wanted to test the insight from Section 3 that the
phase and amplitude of corresponding Long Training
Field samples would change when the receiver is in close
proximity to a transmitting antenna (e.g., when the re-
ceiver is in the transmitter’s near-field region) and would
not change when the receiver is far from the transmit-
ter. To perform these tests, however, we needed access
to the raw LTF samples measured by the receiver. All
Wi-Fi adapters must evaluate LTF samples to correct
for channel effects, so the information required to im-
plement SNAP is available on any Wi-Fi adapter, but
sample-level data is not provided outside the firmware
of commercial Wi-Fi adapters. Because we could not get
the granular phase and amplitude data from commercial
Wi-Fi adapters (even with the CSI tool frequently used
by researchers [16]), we built a custom Wi-Fi receiver
using Software Defined Radio (SDR) and GNU Radio.
We used our Wi-Fi receiver to evaluate signals sent by
four different types of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
transmitters commonly found in consumer electronics.
4.1 Receiver
We used an Ettus Research USRP N210 SDR [11] with a
UBX40 daughterboard and GNU Radio [32]. The USRP
SDR hardware allowed us to receive signals from 10 MHz
to 6 GHz, enough bandwidth to cover both the 2.4 and
5 GHz Wi-Fi bands, and GNU Radio is open-source
software that processes signals sent by the SDR hard-
ware. Our GNU Radio software implementation closely
followed Bloessl et al. [6], but focused on comparing
corresponding LTF samples.
We used our custom Wi-Fi receiver software with the
USRP SDR hardware and a quarter-wavelength dipole
antenna to receive Wi-Fi signals transmitted by several
different types of COTS Wi-Fi antennas. Our receiver is
shown in Figure 7.
4.2 Transmitters
Because dipole and micropatch antennas are the most
common antennas found in consumer electronics [4], we
Figure 7: Receiver. We used a USRP 210N Soft-
ware Defined Radio with a quarter-wavelength
dipole antenna as a Wi-Fi receiver. The USRP
was connected to the antenna via a 3 m RF cable
and to a laptop via a 2 m ethernet cable (laptop
not shown).
focused our testing on those types of transmitting an-
tennas. We tested two different types of dipole antennas
and two different types of micropatch antennas.
4.2.1 Dipole transmit antennas. We used both a half-
wavelength and a quarter-wavelength dipole antenna
connected to an internal Intel Ultimate N WiFi Link
5300 card [18] installed in a Linux laptop to test different
transmitting dipole antennas. We attached each dipole
antenna to a circular base to hold the antenna stationary
and upright during testing. We connected the base to the
laptop with a 3 m long RF cable as shown in Figure 8.
We tested each type of dipole antenna separately.
4.2.2 Micropatch transmit antennas. We tested a Panda
Ultra Wireless N USB Adapter [27] attached to a Linux
laptop via a 1 m USB extender cable. We also used a
micropatch antenna connected to the Intel 5300 card via
a 3 m RF cable.
5 EVALUATION
We transmitted 1,000 Wi-Fi frames from each of the
four different types of antennas (two dipole plus two
micropatch) using BPSK 1/2 encoding [17] on Wi-Fi
channel 1 at distances ranging from 2 cm to 3 m. The Wi-
Fi frames were sent on Layer 2 using a Python program
written with Scapy [5]. Frames were not acknowledged
by our custom Wi-Fi receiver. All tests were conducted
in a busy computer science lab bustling with student
activity. To accurately measure the preamble deviation at
various ranges, all antennas were stationary and oriented
vertically. Testing with antennas offset at angles of 45 and
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Figure 8: Transmitters. We used a quarter-
wavelength and a half-wavelength dipole antenna
as well as a micropatch antenna connected via a
3 m cable to an internal Intel Ultimate N WiFi
Link 5300 adapter installed in a Linux laptop.
We also used a Panda Ultra Wireless N USB
adapter connected via a 1 m USB cable.
90 degrees had different signal strength due to polarity,
but had similar LTF differences.
In our experiments we dropped frames that were not
properly decoded as valid Wi-Fi frames by our receiver.
We used a fixed gain, but Automatic Gain Control (AGC)
might have allowed our system to drop fewer frames (we
did not quantify the number of dropped frames, however,
because our goal was not to evaluate the effectiveness of
the receiver at decoding frames). Blossel et al. note that
for strong signals, such as those from a nearby trans-
mitter, frames can be successfully decoded by a receiver
with relatively low gain. A strong signal, received with
high gain, can result in clipping if the signal overdrives
the analog-to-digital converter. Frames cannot be suc-
cessfully decoded when clipping occurs. Similarly, weak
signals cannot be decoded without additional gain due
to high quantization error [7]. Our fixed gain allowed the
receiver to avoid these issues and decode signals with
high probability over our experimental range.
A commercial Wi-Fi product would likely incorpo-
rate AGC. In that case, gain would be automatically
adjusted downward for nearby strong signals and upward
for weaker, more distant signals. The AGC adjustment
normally happens during the Short Training Field (STF)
and is stabilized prior to the LTF. Because SNAP relies
on the relative difference between repeated portions of
the LTF (we only use the STF for frame detection), and
because the AGC is stabilized prior to the LTF, the pres-
ence of AGC would not significantly change our results.
In engineering a future product, the developer could also
choose to turn off AGC and configure the radio for a low
fixed gain during the operation of SNAP (because it is
only intended to work at close range), and could enable
AGC during other modes of operation.
5.1 Preamble deviation
To measure the difference in phase and amplitude of the
matching portions of the LTF, we calculate the total
Euclidean distance between the phase and amplitude of
subcarriers in 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 as:
𝐸𝑗 =
31∑︁
𝑘=−32
[︂
(ℜ(𝑌1[𝑘])−ℜ(𝑌2[𝑘]))2+
(ℑ(𝑌1[𝑘])−ℑ(𝑌2[𝑘]))2
]︂ 1
2
(10)
where 𝐸𝑗 is the total Euclidean distance between the
phase and amplitude of all subcarriers 𝑘 for frame 𝑗,
and where 𝑌1 is the result of an FFT over 𝑇1 and 𝑌2
is the result of an FFT over 𝑇2, ℜ(𝑌𝑥[𝑘]) is the real
component and ℑ(𝑌𝑥[𝑘]) is the imaginary component
of each subcarrier 𝑘 in 𝑌𝑥, for 𝑥 ∈ {1, 2}. We call this
difference 𝐸𝑗 the preamble deviation of a frame. If the
subcarriers in the two corresponding portions of the LTF
are substantially the same, then the preamble deviation
will be small. If the subcarriers are different in the two
corresponding portions of the LTF, then the preamble
deviation will be large.
Figure 9 shows the distance between 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 for
subcarrier 1 of one frame when the transmitter was
located at 6 cm from the receiver and for subcarrier
1 of another frame sent from 30 cm. We see that at
30 cm 𝑌1 matches 𝑌2, but at 6 cm 𝑌1 does not match
𝑌2 due to near-field effects discussed in Section 3. Each
Wi-Fi symbol, however, is comprised of 64 subcarriers.
Figure 10 shows distance between 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 for all
subcarriers of one frame. We see at 30 cm 𝑌1 and 𝑌2
match for all subcarriers, but at 6 cm many subcarriers
do not match.
The preamble deviation 𝐸𝑗 sums the Euclidean dis-
tance between all subcarriers in a frame. Figure 11 shows
the distribution of preamble deviations according to
Equation (10) for 1,000 Wi-Fi frames received from a
transmitting half-wavelength dipole antenna. We see at
close range 𝐸𝑗 is typically large, but varies due to near-
field effects. At long range (greater than about 12 cm)
the preamble deviation is small and has much lower vari-
ance because the near-field effects have attenuated to
near zero as predicted by Equations (3) and (4). For
brevity we omit the distribution from other types of
transmitting antennas, but they follow a similar pattern,
with each having small preamble deviations and low
variability beyond about 12 cm.
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Figure 9: Constellation diagram showing the dis-
tance between 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 for subcarrier 1. At long
range (30 cm) the distance between 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 for
subcarrier 1 is small. At close range (6 cm) the
difference is large.
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Figure 10: Constellation diagram showing the
distance between 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 for all subcarriers
of one frame. 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 match at long (30 cm)
range, but do not match at close (6 cm) range
due to near-field effects.
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Figure 11: Distribution of preamble deviations
𝐸𝑗 for 1,000 Wi-Fi frames transmitted by a half-
wavelength antenna at each distance. The red
line indicates the median value, the box indicates
the 75th and 25th percentile, and the whiskers
indicate the maximum and minimum value.
We calculate the average preamble deviation over a
number of frames for each antenna type as:
𝐴𝑡 =
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑗=1
𝐸𝑗 (11)
where 𝑡 ∈ {half-wavelength, quarter-wavelength, mi-
cropatch, Panda} is the type of antenna used to send
Wi-Fi frames and 𝑛 = 1, 000 is the number of frames
received. The average preamble deviation over all 1,000
frames sent at each distance for each antenna type is
shown in Figure 12 for distances from 2 cm to 3 m.
As predicted in Section 3, at short range we see large
preamble deviations and at distances beyond roughly
12 cm, we see small preamble deviations. This relation-
ship holds across all antenna types and suggests that a
single-antenna device can monitor the preamble devia-
tion and declare proximity when the preamble deviation
rises above a predetermined threshold.
5.2 Proximity detection
We would like a single-antenna device to be able to
determine proximity with a transmitting device without
help from another source. A simple way to make that
proximity determination using the data in Figure 12
would be to set a threshold, 𝜏 , where if the preamble
deviation for a frame is greater than 𝜏 , the single antenna
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Figure 12: Average preamble deviation by dis-
tance and antenna type using Equation (11). The
average preamble deviation over 1,000 Wi-Fi
frames is large at close range and small at long
range for each antenna type.
device declares proximity, otherwise it does not declare
proximity.
If 𝜏 were set relatively high, say around 0.2 (indicated
by the dashed line in Figure 12), then the single-antenna
device would like not falsely declare proximity when the
transmitter is far away because the preamble deviations
are never over the threshold for any transmitting antenna
type at distances over 14 cm. If the single-antenna device
uses only one frame to determine proximity, however,
it could be the case that the particular frame happens
to have have a low preamble deviation as indicated by
the whiskers in Figure 11 and the single-antenna device
would fail to recognize proximity even though it should.
This situation suggests that proximity detection with
a single-antenna device may benefit from measuring the
preamble deviation from multiple frames before declaring
proximity. Instead of relying on the preamble deviation
from a single frame, we can use Equation (11) to average
the preamble deviation from multiple frames and then
compare that average value with threshold 𝜏 .
To determine the likelihood of detecting proximity us-
ing the average preamble deviation from multiple frames,
we created a Monte Carlo simulation where we randomly
sampled 𝑛 frames from the 1,000 Wi-Fi frames we cap-
tured at each distance between transmitter and receiver,
and then calculated an average preamble deviation over
those 𝑛 frames. The single-antenna device declares prox-
imity if the average is greater than 𝜏 .
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Figure 13: Likelihood of declaring proximity. The
likelihood of a single-antenna device declaring
proximity in 1,000 Monte Carlo simulation runs
at each distance where proximity was declared
if the average preamble deviation for different
numbers of frames was greater than 𝜏 = 0.2. We
see proximity declared with high probability at
close range and never declared over 14 cm.
In Figure 13 we show the likelihood of declaring prox-
imity from 1,000 runs of the Monte Carlo simulation
that randomly selected 𝑛 ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20} Wi-Fi frames
at each distance with 𝜏 = 0.2. The results shown are
the average over all antenna types. We see there is a
high likelihood of declaring proximity when the trans-
mitter, regardless of antenna type, is within about 9 cm
if the receiver uses more than one frame. In fact, we
see that using only two frames performs much better
than a single frame, consistently predicting proximity at
short ranges, and never predicting proximity at ranges
over 14 cm. Using more than two frames results in im-
proved detection probability, however, the amount of
improvement decreases as the number of frames used
increases. Because the single-antenna device is able to
accurately determine proximity using a small number
of frames exchanged on a single Wi-Fi channel, SNAP
can be used by devices during the standard Wi-Fi asso-
ciation process to ensure devices are in close proximity.
This differs significantly from non-standard frequency
hopping approaches proposed by other researchers [34].
5.3 Future exploration
Our experiments suggest that the preamble deviations
caused by the near field of a transmitting antenna allow
a single-antenna device to reliably detect proximity at
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distances under 9 cm and never falsely declare proximity
over 14 cm. We focused our testing on dipole and mi-
cropatch antennas because they are the most common
antennas used in consumer devices. There are, however,
a myriad of other types of antennas: horn, helical, par-
abolic dish, spiral, loop, spiral, Yagi, and bow tie, to
name a few. In future work we plan to examine how
the near field affects these other types of antennas. We
also used the default transmission power settings on the
Wi-Fi devices and have not yet tested with non-standard
power settings, but we expect little difference in results.
Finally, we note that our experiments were conducted
using omni-directional antennas. Directional antennas
may have different characteristics. We believe, however,
that our work here is a starting point and opens an
important new area of research that warrants further
investigation.
6 LIMITATIONS
Above we see that a single-antenna device is able to
reliably detect proximity with a transmitting device if
the single-antenna device is in the near field of the trans-
mitter. Our experiments suggest that the single-antenna
device can reliably detect proximity out to roughly 9 cm
for dipole and micropatch antennas. These results as-
sume, however, that the transmitter is sending properly
formed Wi-Fi frames where 𝑇1 in the Long Training
Field matches 𝑇2. It could be the case that a sophisti-
cated adversary transmits a malformed Wi-Fi preamble
where 𝑇1 does not match 𝑇2 in an attempt to trick the
single-antenna device into falsely declaring proximity.
That adversary might pre-compute a mismatched LTF
and send those samples with a Software Defined Radio.
In this case, a single-antenna device could potentially be
tricked into declaring proximity when in fact the trans-
mitter is far away. We propose two ways a single-antenna
device might overcome such a sophisticated adversary
and we also discuss scenarios where proximity alone is
insufficient for trust.
6.1 Help from a trusted device
A single-antenna device might be able to overcome an ad-
versary transmitting malformed preambles if the single-
antenna device has a pre-existing trusted relationship
with another device known to be far away (perhaps by
measuring the preamble of signals from the trusted de-
vice), such as a Wi-Fi router. If the single-antenna device
detects a preamble deviation greater than 𝜏 , it could ask
the trusted device to confirm the trusted device sees a
matching preamble from the same transmitter. Provided
the trusted device is located more than about 18 cm from
the single-antenna device (i.e., two times the effective
range of the preamble detection technique to rule out a
legitimate transmitter positioned in between the single-
antenna device and trusted device), the trusted device
will see a matching preamble if the preamble is properly
formed and can inform the single-antenna device. If the
preamble is malformed, both devices will see the high
preamble deviation; with the trusted device’s input, the
single-antenna device can conclude an adversary sent
the frames with malformed preambles.
6.2 Signal strength
In many use cases there will not be a trusted device with
which the single-antenna device can confer. In those
instances, the single-antenna device can examine the
strength of the signal when it detects a high preamble
deviation. Signal strength is a notoriously bad indicator
of distance, but because signal strength drops with the
square of distance, a distant adversary will need to trans-
mit a high-power signal for the single-antenna device to
receive it with the same strength as a signal from a legit-
imate device located a few centimeters away. To prevent
the distant adversary from tricking the single-antenna
device into believing malformed preambles are legiti-
mate signals from a nearby device, the single-antenna
device can measure the signal strength of frames with
high preamble deviations and reject frames with a signal
strength below a threshold. We see next that even with
a high-gain antenna, and an unlawfully high transmit
power, an adversary’s signal strength will be well below
the signal strength of a legitimate device located nearby,
making it possible for the single-antenna device to reject
the weaker signals.
Assuming the adversary is in the far-field region, then
signal strength will attenuate as it travels from trans-
mitter to receiver as predicted by the well-known Friis
equation [33]
𝑃𝑟 = 𝑃𝑡 +𝐺𝑡 +𝐺𝑟 + 20log
(︂
𝜆
4𝜋𝑑
)︂2
(12)
where 𝑃𝑟 is the power received in dBm, 𝑃𝑡 is the power
at the surface of the transmitting antenna in dBm, 𝐺𝑡
and 𝐺𝑟 are the gains of the transmitting and receiving
antennas, 𝜆 is the frequency of the signal, and 𝑑 is
the distance between the transmitting and receiving
antennas.
Using Equation (12), we see that a signal from a
legitimate device with 𝑃𝑡 = 27 dBm, 𝐺𝑡 = 3 dBi, and
located 5 cm away would be received on a single-antenna
device with a signal strength of slightly over 19 dBm,
assuming 𝐺𝑟 = 3 dBi. To estimate the amount of power
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a distant adversary could need to transmit to achieve
the same signal strength at the single-antenna device,
we can rewrite Equation (12) as
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟 −𝐺𝑡 −𝐺𝑟 − 20log
(︂
𝜆
4𝜋𝑑
)︂2
. (13)
To match the signal strength of a nearby device, Equa-
tion (13) suggests that an adversary with a standard
3 dBi antenna located 1 m away would need to trans-
mit a signal at a whopping 53 dBm – well above the
capabilities of SDRs. The Ettus Research UBX-40 daugh-
terboard for the N210 SDR, for example, transmits at
roughly 20 dBm in the Wi-Fi frequency range. The pop-
ular HackRF One [15] tops out at 15 dBm in the Wi-Fi
frequency bands. In fact, in the United States the Fed-
eral Communications Commission sets the legal limit
for transmitters in the 2.4 GHz band at 30 dBm [12].
Nonetheless, we assume that an adversary does not stay
within the FCC’s limits and may have a more powerful
transmitter. We acknowledge that there is theoretically
no limit to how much power the adversary can transmit,
but we assume a realistic adversary has some practical
bounds on its transmitting capability. For discussion pur-
poses, we consider an adversary capable of transmitting
at 36 dBm – four times the limit set by the FCC and
more than 32 times the power of the HackRF One. Fur-
thermore, we assume the adversary may use a high-gain
antenna to increase the strength of the signal received
by the single-antenna device.
Commercially available high-gain Wi-Fi antennas are
normally relatively large panel or parabolic dish anten-
nas that provide up to approximately 20 dBi gain. For
example, the Altelix 2.4 GHz parabolic dish antenna pro-
vides 15 dBi gain and is nearly one-half meter long [2].
While it is possible this antenna, or one like it, could
be concealed inside of furniture or possibly behind a
low signal-attenuating wall, in many cases a user would
notice the presence of the one-half meter long antenna
if it is within two meters from the single-antenna device.
Additionally, the single-antenna device may be mobile,
making it difficult to preposition a high-gain antenna
such that it is focused on the mobile device while data
is transferred.
Using Equation (13), and assuming 𝐺𝑟 = 3 dBi on the
single-antenna device, in Table 1 we show the amount
of power in dBm that an adversary would need to trans-
mit to match the signal strength of a legitimate device
transmitting from a few centimeters away. We assume
the legitimate device transmits at 27 dBm (e.g., half the
FCC limit) from 5 cm away. We assume the adversary
is located one to three meters away and has a high gain
Figure 14: Altelix high-gain antenna. This an-
tenna provides 15 dBm gain, but is nearly one-
half meter wide.
Adversary distance (cm)
𝐺𝑡 100 150 200 250 300
0 56 60 62 64 66
3 53 57 59 61 63
6 50 54 56 58 60
9 47 51 53 55 57
12 44 48 50 52 54
15 41 45 47 49 51
18 38 42 44 46 48
21 35 39 41 43 45
24 32 36 38 40 42
Table 1: Required adversary transmit power. This table
shows the amount of power in dBm that an adversary
located a given distance from a single-antenna device
using an antenna with gain 𝐺𝑡 would need to transmit
to have a signal arrive at the single-antenna device with
the same signal strength as a legitimate nearby device.
Highlighted cells indicate configurations where the ad-
versary would be able to match or exceed the legitimate
signal if transmitting at four times the legal limit set by
the FCC or below. We see that even with high transmit
power and high-gain antenna, is most cases an adversary
cannot achieve enough signal strength.
antenna with 𝐺𝑡 ranging up to 24 dBi. Highlighted cells
indicate configurations where the adversary would be
able to match or exceed the legitimate signal if trans-
mitting at four times the legal limit set by the FCC
(36 dBm) or below. We see that in most cases, even
with the high transmit power and high-gain antenna, the
adversary cannot achieve a higher signal strength than
a legitimate nearby device transmitting at one-half the
maximum level set by the FCC.
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6.3 Raising the bar for an adversary
In most practical cases the single-antenna device can
use signal strength to determine if a frame with a high
preamble deviation was sent by a distant adversary, even
if that adversary transmits at unlawfully high power
and uses a high-gain antenna. We consider our methods
as a way of “raising the bar” that an adversary must
overcome. It could be the case that the adversary has an
extraordinarily high transmit power, an extremely high-
gain antenna, and is within three meters of the single-
antenna device. In those cases our method could fail, but
our method raises the bar well above the capabilities of
off-the-shelf hardware.
6.4 Proximity alone is not sufficient
In many scenarios proximity is necessary, but not suffi-
cient, as an indicator of trust. Indeed, in most cases the
user may not want their devices to pair with other de-
vices that get physically close. For example, in a crowded
subway people may be packed together tightly. Any de-
vices they wear or carry may then come into unintended
proximity with other devices. In those use cases, where
devices may encounter untrusted devices, we anticipate
that a system using SNAP’s technique would require the
user to take an action such as intentionally pushing a
button to initiate the proximity detection process, rather
than blindly trusting nearby devices. Proximity detection
used in conjunction with user intent could help prevent
distant adversaries from tricking legitimate devices into
accepting malicious frames.
7 RELATED WORK
Exploiting the repeating nature of Wi-Fi OFDM pream-
bles and near-field effects has not been explored in the lit-
erature. Work thus far has primarily focused on covertly
embedding a small amount of data into the Wi-Fi frame
and on device fingerprinting based on PHY layer at-
tributes. Both of these approaches are substantially dif-
ferent from SNAP’s methods and we examine each of
them in this section. Additionally, because Near Field
Communications (NFC) also uses the near field of a
transmitting antenna, we review that approach as well.
7.1 Embedding covert information in
Wi-Fi frames
Classen et al. examined covert channels possible within
standard Wi-Fi frames [9] to covertly embed information.
In particular they analyzed methods to use the Short
Training Field with Phase Shift Keying (STF PSK), Car-
rier Frequency Offset with Frequency Shift Keying (CFO
FSK), using additional subcarriers while still conform-
ing to Wi-Fi standards, and replacing portions of the
Cyclic Prefix with covert data. In each of these cases
the idea is to embed information in the Wi-Fi frame in
a way that a standard receiver would not notice. While
these techniques involve the PHY layer and often use
the preamble, they do not enable proximity detection.
In related work Rahbari and Krunz proposed a tech-
nique they call P-modulation to modulate the STF in
a standards-compliant manner to include up to eight
user-chosen bits in a 20 MHz wide Wi-Fi frame [29].
These bits can be used to inform other devices of the
transmitter’s status, possibly eliminating the need for
additional control frames. This technique, however, is
different from our technique in that we use the repeating
nature of the Long Training Field to establish proximity,
not to use it to include a small number of indicator bits.
7.2 Device fingerprinting
There have been numerous studies on fingerprinting
wireless devices. Many of these approaches focus on PHY
layer imperfections resulting from manufacturing such
as clock skews [3] and can determine subtle radiometric
differences between devices. These differences can often
lead to identification of device type, and can sometimes
also lead to specific device identification [26, 36].
While identifying specific devices based on their radio
characteristics can be useful in some use cases, these
techniques do not provide an indication of trust. It could
be the case that a single-antenna device is able to dis-
tinguish between transmitters based on the (presum-
ably non-spoofed) radiometric signatures of signals it
receives, but the single-antenna device does not know if
the transmitter is a legitimate nearby device or a distant
adversary – it simply knows transmissions came from
the same device.
Fingerprinting and our single-antenna proximity de-
tection technique could, however, work together. One
solution would be to use our proximity detection tech-
nique to know when a user brings a new device near a
single-antenna device. The idea is that proximity deter-
mines the trustworthiness of the new device (whether
the new device is compromised in some manner is out of
scope for this work). In addition to detecting proximity,
the single-antenna device could record radiometric de-
tails about the signal it receives from the new device. If
the user later separates the devices, the single-antenna
device could examine the radiometric details of the signal
to identify data sent by the new device.
The goal of re-identifying a known device could also
be accomplished, however, if the single-antenna device
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shares a unique key with the new device when they are
in close proximity. In future communications the devices
could use the key to encrypt or sign messages, even if
the two devices are now far apart.
7.3 Near Field Communications
Near Field Communications (NFC) is a short-range com-
munication technique, not a proximity detection method,
that uses two loop antennas to transfer data between
devices located roughly 10 cm apart. These systems
transmit in an ISM (Industrial, Scientific, Medical) fre-
quency band at 13.56 MHz [10] and rely on magnetic
induction to transfer data [31]. Induction occurs when
a receiver is in the transmitter’s near-field region and
does not occur in the transmitter’s far-field region. This
near-field requirement implies that data can be securely
transferred at short ranges (e.g., within 𝑅1 from Equa-
tion (5)), without fear of interception by more distant
eavesdroppers. Recent work, however, has shown that
NFC communications can be read up to 2.4 m from the
transmitter [37], making NFC a questionable choice for
secure communications.
Despite the questionable security aspects of NFC, it
is becoming increasingly popular on cell phones. Aside
from mobile payment systems, this increased popular-
ity, however, has not translated into wide-spread usage.
Android Beam, for example, is a feature of the Android
operation system initially deployed with version 4.0, Ice
Cream Sandwich, that can bootstrap a Bluetooth connec-
tion by exchanging keys over NFC [14]. Android Beam
initially generated a great deal of excitement but has
seen limited adoption. In fact ComputerWorld noted
that “... despite the admirable marketing effort, Android
Beam never quite worked particularly well ...” [20].
Additionally, because NFC requires specialized radios
and antennas, it is not commonly found on IoT-type
devices. SNAP, however, accomplishes some of the same
tasks NFC was designed to accomplish, but does not
require specialized radios or antennas. Instead, SNAP
uses the in-band Wi-Fi radio commonly found on such
devices.
8 CONCLUSION
Because radio waves are invisible, a user may believe
that a wireless device is communicating with a nearby
device when in fact the user’s device is communicating
with a distant adversary. Knowing that a transmitter is
in close physical proximity could eliminate that distant
adversary problem. While other researchers have sug-
gested methods for multiple-antenna devices to estimate
the location of a transmitter, these techniques are not
available to single-antenna IoT-type devices. In this pa-
per we show that a single-antenna device following the
standard Wi-Fi protocol can reliably determine when it
is in close proximity to a transmitting device by lever-
aging the repeating nature of Wi-Fi’s preamble and the
physical characteristics of signals in the transmitter’s
near-field region.
Our experiments suggest that mismatches in the pre-
amble caused by the near field of a transmitting an-
tenna can allow a single-antenna device to reliably detect
proximity at distances under 9 cm while never falsely
declaring proximity at ranges greater than 14 cm. This
proximity determination can then be used as one basis
for trust when new IoT devices are encountered and can
ensure that a device is communicating with an intended
nearby device, not the distant adversary.
We focused our testing on dipole and micropatch an-
tennas because they are the most common antennas used
in consumer devices, but there are a myriad of other
types of antennas we have not yet tested. In future work
we will examine the near-field effects on these other types
of antennas. We believe, however, that our work here
is a starting point and opens an important new area of
research that warrants further investigation.
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